Paraguay designates Comando Vermelho,
PCC as terrorist organizations
The decree says the designation aligns with a state policy reaffirming the country's commitment to democracy, the rule of law and national sovereignty. It also allows for tougher penalties and strengthens international cooperation on security and extradition.
"For us, there is no doubt that these are criminal groups seeking to destabilize countries, and we must confront them," Peña said on TV Paraguay.
The move follows a major operation by Brazil's state police targeting organized crime in two Rio de Janeiro favelas, which left more than 120 people dead, many of them believed to be members of Comando Vermelho. Brazilian authorities described it as one of the deadliest anti-crime operations in recent years.
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In response, Paraguay's National Defense Council ordered the highest level of alert along the entire border with Brazil and instructed the armed forces, National Police and Migration Directorate to increase personnel and resources to bolster national security.
Authorities also announced coordination with security forces from Brazil and Argentina to conduct joint patrols and surveillance operations at border crossings and transit zones to prevent members of those criminal groups from entering the country.
Interior Minister Enrique Riera said the operational plan is underway, prioritizing intelligence work, drone-based aerial surveillance and coordination between military and police units.
The plan also calls for intensifying efforts against smuggling and organized crime, especially at the end of the year.
Riera added that security will be reinforced at prisons housing members of these criminal organizations.
According to Paraguayan media, both criminal organizations have a strong presence along the Paraguay-Brazil border, where they operate networks involved in drug and arms trafficking and money laundering.
The PCC has been operating in Paraguay for more than a decade, with a history of prison riots and executions, while Comando Vermelho has also expanded its influence in recent years, particularly in the country's northern region, the Paraguayan newspaper ABC reported.
Chile's president pushes constitutional reform for more border control
Border control is handled by Carabineros de Chile, the national police, and when the armed forces are needed for specific security operations, the government must request congressional authorization every 90 days.
The proposed reform, introduced earlier this month in the Senate for debate, would grant the armed forces power to conduct identity checks and searches. It would also allow soldiers to detain individuals caught committing crimes and hand them over to the Carabineros de Chile, or the Investigative Police.
According to the reform bill, the current situation is described as troubling.
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"Along with the impact of irregular migration on the country, social cohesion and public policies, this phenomenon has been exploited by transnational criminal organizations to expand illicit markets such as smuggling, human trafficking and drug trafficking, among others, as well as to facilitate the illegal entry or exit of gang members through unauthorized crossings," the document states.
Days before the bill's introduction, Boric said he was confident Congress would move quickly to approve the reform "because that is what Chileans expect."
The National Prosecutor's Office, the agency that investigates crimes in Chile, on Monday released its 2025 Organized Crime Report, revealing that at least 16 transnational criminal organizations are operating in the country, including Venezuela's Tren de Aragua, Colombia's Los Shottas and the Trinitarios, active in the Dominican Republic and the United States.
Although drug trafficking remains the dominant criminal activity -- accounting for nearly half of all income linked to organized crime in 2023 and 2024 -- the report noted that crimes such as kidnapping and extortion showed the sharpest increases, while homicides dropped significantly.
The surge in irregular migration and organized crime has dominated Chile's public and political agenda ahead of the elections. Presidential and congressional elections are set for Nov. 16, and the government is signaling its priorities through measures such as this proposed constitutional reform.
"One of the most prominent issues on the national agenda concerns crime and irregular migration, which people tend to see as connected," political scientist Claudio Fuentes, director of the Institute for Social Science Research at Diego Portales University, told UPI.
He added that the reform proposal aims to show the government's concern, "particularly that of the Chilean left, about border security, given the prominence the issue has gained and in the context of the presidential elections."
Fuentes said the problem is that the government does not control either chamber of Congress, so the initiative will depend on opposition parties.
"It's unlikely to be approved before the end of the administration [in March] because lawmakers are debating the 2026 budget in the middle of the parliamentary campaign. So this bill is more of a political gesture than a legislative measure likely to be discussed," he said.
From Fuentes' perspective, certain aspects must be addressed first.
Another bill pending in Congress would regulate the armed forces' use of force in situations such as border control. Fuentes warned a risk exists that the military could operate under rules that might expose its members to legal consequences if they are accused of using excessive force in certain circumstances.
Panama Canal Authority to build, grant concessions for two new ports
According to information released by the authority in a press release, the terminals are planned for two strategic areas along the canal, one on the Pacific coast in Corozal and the other on the Atlantic side at Telfers Island.
The goal of both projects is to expand container-handling capacity and strengthen Panama's position as an interoceanic logistics hub.
With the addition of these two terminals, the goal is to increase container capacity from about 9.5 million (20-foot equivalent units per year to roughly 15 million. The projects also aim to expand port capacity in the interoceanic area, which is operating near its limit.
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The Corozal port, on the Pacific coast, would take advantage of its proximity to the canal's western entrance to capture container traffic using the interoceanic route. The Telfers Island project, on the Atlantic side, would cover the other end of the canal, facilitating both transshipment and cargo transfers between ocean routes.
Together, the two projects would reinforce Panama's strategy to move beyond a transit route and establish itself as a logistics center, transshipment port and industrial platform for the region.
The authority said it expects to award the concessions by late 2026, allowing the terminals to begin operations in early 2029. It has begun discussions with representatives from about 20 global maritime operators to identify potential partners for the port development.
Representatives from APM Terminals (Denmark), Cosco Shipping Ports (China), CMA Terminals-CMA (France), DP World (United Arab Emirates), Hanseatic Global Terminals (Germany), MOL (Japan), PSA International (Singapore), SSA Marine-Carrix Group (United States) and Terminal Investment Limited (Switzerland) took part in the initial round of talks.
However, in Panama's public debate, there is discussion over whether the concession model is the most appropriate way to develop the projects or if the authority should operate the terminals.
The discussion follows an audit by the Office of the Comptroller General into Panama Ports Co. -- a subsidiary of China's CK Hutchison that operates key terminals in the country-- that found multimillion-dollar shortfalls in payments owed to the state, though the discrepancies were attributed to a "poorly negotiated" initial contract.
The Panama Canal also faces additional challenges in developing the new ports, including the need to secure supporting infrastructure, such as road access, dredging, water supply, logistics services and environmental impact studies required for these large-scale projects.
The initiative comes amid a global context in which container ships continue to grow in size, maritime routes seek greater efficiency and logistics hubs compete fiercely across Latin America.
As part of the Panama Canal's Vision 2025-2035 plan, container terminals are seen as key components of the supporting infrastructure, second in importance only to the locks and navigation channels. Their development aims to strengthen port capacity and ensure the competitiveness of Panama's maritime route.
In mid-September, the authority also announced development of a natural gas pipeline. The project aims to create a new overland energy route that would complement the existing canal by linking the Pacific and Atlantic coasts across Panama.
The pipeline would transport liquefied natural gas and other gases, such as propane and butane, from one ocean to the other without ships having to transit the canal. It would extend 47 miles and have the capacity to transfer up to 2.5 million barrels of gas per day.
The authority estimates that the project, which has drawn interest from about 45 energy companies, will cost between $4 billion and $5 billion. It also expects the concession to be awarded in the fourth quarter of 2026.
Latin America is China’s laboratory in Washington’s ‘backyard'
In late September, China took another step toward embedding itself in Latin America’s institutional architecture. The Andean Community – comprising Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru – admitted China as an observer, joining a growing list of regional organizations that have opened their doors to Beijing. At first glance, the gesture might appear ceremonial. But for both sides, it represents something much more consequential: a consolidation of China’s position as an indispensable partner in Latin America’s search for autonomy, development, and global relevance.
This new status reflects a pattern that has been maturing for over three decades. Since the 1990s, China has methodically leveraged regional platforms to anchor its diplomacy across the Global South. With the Andean Community now added to the roster, Beijing holds membership or observer status in nine Latin American organizations. This strategy has less to do with symbolism and more to do with influence. By participating in regional frameworks, China gains a voice in shaping agendas, trade norms, and development priorities from within.
The multilateral turn
China’s involvement in Latin America has long been multilateral in character. The China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum remains the centerpiece of this engagement. Through it, Beijing has sought to project itself as a cooperative, non-interventionist alternative to Western powers. Earlier this year, President Xi Jinping announced a $9 billion credit line for the region, pledged greater imports of Latin American goods, and called for broader Chinese investment. Significantly, the new action plan extends beyond economics, covering anti-corruption, law enforcement, and judicial cooperation.
This evolution demonstrates that Beijing does not see Latin America merely as a source of raw materials or an export destination. It sees it as a political laboratory – a place where a new model of South-South partnership can be tested and refined. The observer seat in the Andean Community is thus an institutional complement to China’s broader network of multilateral engagements, solidifying its regional legitimacy and access.
Latin America between poles
Latin America’s attraction for China lies not only in its markets or mineral wealth. The region represents a crucial segment of the Global South – diverse, resource-rich, and still navigating the contradictions of postcolonial identity. For decades, it has been torn between historical ties to Europe, a complex dependency on the United States, and a growing desire for strategic autonomy.
That search for independence has now become a defining fault line of world politics. The Trump administration’s revival of the Monroe Doctrine – asserting US primacy in the hemisphere – reflects Washington’s determination to prevent rival powers, especially China, from gaining ground in its “backyard.” Under the new US strategy, Latin America is treated as a twin priority alongside the Indo-Pacific. Pressure on regional governments to align with US security interests has intensified. The result is a region in flux – pulled between a resurgent Washington and an increasingly promising Beijing.
The economic chessboard
Nowhere is this tug-of-war more visible than in trade and investment. The region has become a theater for overlapping economic initiatives: the EU-Mercosur trade deal, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and Washington’s intermittent attempts at hemispheric frameworks such as the Partnership for Economic Prosperity and the ‘Growth in the Americas’.
China’s counter-strategy has been both more consistent and more pragmatic. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, it has signed cooperation agreements with 24 Latin American states, most recently Colombia – a symbolic defection from Washington’s orbit. China’s success lies in its ability to translate diplomatic overtures into concrete projects faster than its Western competitors. For many Latin American governments, Beijing’s model of deal-making – focused on quick financing, limited conditionalities, and visible outcomes – aligns better with domestic development goals than the lengthy, politically charged negotiations characteristic of Western aid and investment.
The scale of integration
The numbers tell the story. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner after the US. Bilateral trade reached $520 billion in 2024, up 6% from the previous year. China accounts for about a third of the region’s mineral exports is the largest trading partner for Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay.
This trade dynamic is double-edged. On one side, Latin American economies have gained unprecedented access to Chinese markets, enabling growth and fiscal stability. On the other, they face increasing competition from Chinese goods and risk becoming locked into a commodity-export pattern that inhibits industrial diversification. For Beijing, Latin America offers what few regions can: abundant resources, expanding consumer markets, and a diplomatic constituency sympathetic to a multipolar order.
Beyond trade: security and space
Beijing’s presence in Latin America now extends into security and defense cooperation. China’s efforts to cultivate military ties with its regional partners extend beyond arms sales to include officer exchanges, training programs, and joint exercises. Venezuela remains the leading purchaser of Chinese military equipment, while Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador have also expanded their defense acquisitions from Beijing in recent years. Meanwhile, Cuba has deepened its long-standing military and intelligence cooperation with China, further underscoring the strategic dimension of China’s engagement in the Western Hemisphere.
In parallel, China’s engagement in space technology underscores its ambitions beyond the economic sphere. The establishment of ground stations across Latin America, the launch of a China-CELAC Space Cooperation Forum, and the creation of a BRICS Joint Committee on Space Cooperation reveal a sophisticated long-term plan. Space has become a new frontier for influence – scientific, commercial, and military.
Washington’s dilemma
Unsurprisingly, Washington views these developments with alarm. Under Trump, the US response has leaned heavily on coercive tools: tariffs, sanctions, and diplomatic pressure. Yet these measures have often backfired, driving even US-friendly governments to seek greater independence. By contrast, Beijing’s approach – cutting tariffs, expanding free trade agreements, and offering predictability – has positioned China as a stabilizing partner amid US volatility.
The irony is striking. In attempting to contain China, Washington may have accelerated its penetration. Even leaders who share Washington’s ideological outlook, such as Argentina’s Javier Milei or El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, have chosen to preserve pragmatic ties with Beijing. Across the region, free trade agreements with China have multiplied – from Chile and Peru to Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Ecuador – with negotiations underway elsewhere. The logic is clear: China provides options, and options are leverage.
This dynamic even shapes US financial policy. In October, Washington approved a $20 billion bailout for Argentina – not only to prevent economic collapse but also to preempt Chinese financial assistance. The bailout reflects a deeper anxiety: that China might emerge as a problem-solver in a region long dominated by US institutions.
The meaning of the Andean step
Within this larger picture, China’s new role in the Andean Community becomes far more than a procedural milestone. It symbolizes the normalization of Chinese participation in Latin America’s internal institutions. For the Andean states, the decision underscores a desire to assert themselves as autonomous actors capable of engaging multiple partners. For China, it represents an institutional foothold in a resource-rich subregion central to its industrial future.
The Andean bloc, with its abundant lithium, copper, and agricultural exports, fits neatly into Beijing’s development blueprint. Cooperation within this framework allows China to pursue its supply-chain ambitions while promoting its image as a partner in sustainable development. It also strengthens Beijing’s hand in shaping standards, environmental frameworks, and digital governance in the region. If handled with strategic clarity, China’s rise in the region could accelerate long-sought diversification and development. If mishandled, it could merely replace one dependency with another.
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