"For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine; but wanting to have their ears tickled, they will accumulate for themselves teachers in accordance to their own desires, and will turn away their ears from the truth and will turn aside to myths." Northwoods is a ministry dedicated to refreshing Christians and challenging them to search for the truth in Christianity, politics, sociology, and science
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Reuters reported in May about Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s unprecedented crackdown on his opponents. One of those is Özgür Özel, whose power, due to his popularity, Erdogan has attempted to neutralize. “Özel said he had been forced to leave the party founded by modern Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk after a court annulled the CHP congress that brought him to power, deepening the country’s political crisis.” But Özel isn’t going down so easily. More about his new party:
Turkish opposition leader to create breakaway party to take on Erdoğan
The deposed leader of Turkey’s main opposition party has said he is creating a new political party to challenge President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in a bold move that could reshape Turkish politics. Özgür Özel’s gambit could unite Turkey’s fractured opposition, mobilise disgruntled voters and threaten Erdoğan at the next presidential election scheduled for 2028. But he also faces the risk of prosecution as part of a continuing legal crackdown by Turkish authorities against government critics and dissent. Recent polls suggest that Özel’s still unnamed “new party” would handily beat Erdoğan’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) if a vote were held today. “We are charting a new path,” Özel said to lawmakers of the main opposition Republican People’s Party, or CHP, in Ankara on Tuesday. “We will leave no one behind . . . on this march to power,” he added to rapturous applause. “We carry within us the unwavering hope of a new beginning.”
Photo: Özgür Özel, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
Erdogan will predictably continue efforts to suppress any threats to his leadership from Özel.
Last year, Jihad Watch reported about another key opponent besides Özgür Özel, who also threatens Erdogan: Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, whom Erdogan likewise targeted. Imamoglu had considerable support in his bid to challenge Erdogan for the presidency, but then he was arbitrarily detained on “corruption” suspicions — which are often conjured up against anyone who threatens Erdogan’s authority or leadership. Imamoglu was arrested, interrogated, jailed, and stripped of his title as mayor. The furious protests that subsequently erupted in Turkey were a threat to Erdogan. What happened next was even more potentially disastrous for the Turkish president. Despite Imamoglu’s incarceration, the opposition CHP party officially nominated him anyway as its presidential candidate for the 2028 elections. The numbers in support of him were overwhelming. “Some 15 million people voted” in the primary. Erdogan had hoped that Imamoglu would languish in jail and be silenced, but he is doing neither. The Guardian subsequently published a letter Imamoglu wrote from jail HERE. In February, Imamoglu dared Erdogan to call early elections.
History repeats itself in a modern-day Turkey, where Erdogan, the self-appointed embodiment of the Ottoman caliphate, stands against the past leader of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s CHP party, Özgür Özel, whose new breakaway party is expected to draw many from the CHP. Ideally, Özeland Imamoglu would find a way to join forces to unite the opposition and fight against Erdogan’s crackdown and tyranny.
The Financial Post further states that with Özel’s popularity and high profile, “he helped lead the CHP to a resounding victory against the AKP in the 2024 municipal elections.” And that his successes are “likely to place him at the centre of the opposition’s efforts to unseat Erdoğan, who has governed Turkey for more than 23 years.”
Between the tenacious Özel and Ekrem Imamoglu, Erdogan finds himself facing a dual threat at the ballot box to his tight grip on power. Erdogan will no doubt continue to tyrannize both Özel and Imamoglu and wage a ferocious battle against both ahead of Turkey’s next election in May 2028, as he views these opponents as existential threats.
In the meantime, both opposition leaders can exert diplomatic pressure on Erdogan by appealing to international human rights watchdogs, as well as to NATO, of which Turkey is still a member. They can also appeal under the European Convention on Human Rights. These measures would stir media interest, and embarrass and potentially isolate Erdogan, giving Turkish democracy a fighting chance in 2028.
As I have mentioned a few times before, it is possible that Turkey, not Russia, could lead the End Times assault on Israel. It certainly is Erdogan's ambition to do so.
Erdogan Plans for Turkey to Replace Iran as Leader of Gulf Muslims
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey has long harbored dreams of glory. A few years ago, he predicted that in the future there could be a war between “the Crescent and the Cross,” and he clearly saw himself as leading the forces of the Crescent — the world’s Muslims — against the world’s Christians. In another vision, he presented Turkey as the leader of a pan-Islamic army that would be strong enough to take on, and defeat, the Jewish state. Now, as he watches the American and Israeli militaries batter the Islamic Republic of Iran, he is planning to replace Iran as the major Muslim power in the Middle East and North Africa. More on Erdogan’s view of Turkey’s future role in the region can be found here:
Israel’s next test: Turkey positions itself to lead a post-Islamic Iran Middle East – opinion
As the regional architecture of the Middle East undergoes a violent transformation, observers are beginning to realize that the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not the end of the story but the beginning of a far more complex chapter.
The conflict, dubbed Operation Roaring Lion, has entered a phase where the systemic deterrence of the mullahs is effectively finished. However, history teaches us that the moment of greatest victory is often the moment of greatest danger.
We have reached what historians now call a 1919 Moment, a juncture where the primary threats of the past decade – Sunni jihadism and the Iranian proxy network – have been beaten, but the victorious alliance is already beginning to fracture.
The most significant and dangerous crack in this new order is the rising ambition of Islamist Turkey. For months, the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has adopted a strategy that prioritized the survival of the clerical regime in Tehran as a counterweight to Western influence.
Now that the Iranian regime is in its death throes, Ankara is shifting its messaging to prepare for a direct confrontation with the new regional reality. Pro-government Turkish columnists have begun to frame Israel as the last obstacle to regional stability, with some explicitly claiming that after Iran, it will be Turkey’s turn.
Despite the fears of those columnists, Israel has no intention of attacking Turkey. Turkey is much less of a threat to the Jewish state; it does not possess a nuclear weapons program; it has not rushed headlong to produce thousands of ballistic missiles. Turkish crowds do not scream “Death to Israel,” even if hostility to the Jewish state is widespread. Unlike the Islamic Republic, Turkey does not see destroying Israel as central to its being. Unlike Iran, Turkey is a member of the Western alliance, NATO, and its military leaders have over almost 80 years fostered close ties with the American generals.
This rhetoric is not accidental; it is a calculated effort to position Turkey as the sole remaining champion of political Islam in a vacuum left by the IRGC. Ankara fears that a Western-aligned or Israel-friendly government in Tehran would permanently shift the balance of power, leaving Erdogan as a regional outlier.
Would not Sunni Turkey be much more successful as a regional power than was Shi’a Iran, given that the Sunni Arabs of the Gulf are hostile to the Shi’a, with some of those Sunnis even considering the Shi’a to be “rafidite dogs” to be mistrusted and scorned as little better than Infidels?
The signs of this shift are most visible in Syria, which has become the epicenter of the new power struggle. The recent appointment of Kurdish commander Sipan Hemo as Syria’s Assistant Defense Minister for the Eastern Region is a watershed moment.
While on the surface this appears to be a local administrative move by the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, it is actually a signal that Turkey and its regional partners are moving faster than the West to consolidate the spaces once held by Iran….
By appointing a Kurdish commander to a high post in the Ministry of Defense, the Syrian leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is hoping to co-opt the Kurds in Syria who might be tempted to revolt against Damascus in order to obtain greater autonomy, or even gain, with the help of Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, an independent Kurdish state. Instead, al-Sharaa is giving high-profile positions to a handful of Kurds, in an attempt to persuade the Kurdish population that they will play important roles in the new government. That might lessen Kurdish resentment of rule from Damascus.
Erdogan, meanwhile, knows that Israel and the U.S. will be victorious against Iran, but doesn’t want the victory to be too overwhelming, leaving Israel to be perceived as the strongest military power in the region. He would like Iran to continue to be a threat to the Jewish state, not through its greatly diminished store of ballistic missiles and its nuclear program which is about to be wiped out, but through the huge size of its various military groups. Iran’s armed forces consist of 150,000 active personnel in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 350,000 in the regular army, and between one and five million men in the Basij militia.
Israel and the United States are performing a spectacular and indispensable service to the region and the world by destroying Iran’s military threat — its ballistic missiles and its nuclear program. But the ideology of these fanatical Shia could be replaced by the aggressive Sunni expansionism that has taken hold in Turkey ever since Erdogan became a national figure.
The Americans and Israelis, and those Gulf Arab states that have joined the Abraham Accords, constitute a coalition that could contain any Turkish moves to become the hegemonic power in the region. Turkish designs on Syria, where Istanbul has established military outposts to keep the Syrian Kurds in check, should be opposed by the Americans. Washington does have considerable leverage over Turkey; it supplies almost all of the country’s weaponry; the American military hold joint training sessions and maneuvers with the Turkish military. Some NATO members, alarmed at the re-Islamization and de-Kemalization of Turkey, as Turkey becomes ever more “Islamic,” have even spoken about Turkey no longer being fit for NATO membership — especially as it has threatened violence against another NATO member, Greece.
After the definitive military defeat of the Iranian regime — though not necessarily its replacement by a democracy — President Erdogan’s ambitions in the region should be swiftly shot down. Israel will need no convincing. Nor will the Gulf Arab states, whose people are well aware of how the Ottoman Turks mistreated their Arab subjects during four hundred years of imperial rule. Erdogan doesn’t dare attack Turkey’s hereditary enemy, Greece, because it is a member of NATO and could invoke Article 5; nor can the Turks expand their foothold on Cyprus without earning the ire of the other NATO members. And always there will be the threat hanging over Ankara if it tries to expand the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, or if it tries to create, on the Iranian model, proxies in the region, chiefly by sending money and weapons to Hamas in Gaza or to the Muslim Brotherhood in any of a half-dozen Gulf countries. That threat is twofold: Washington will cut off all weapons sales to Ankara and may even call for expelling Turkey from NATO. That should keep the Padishah in check.
For years, it's been obvious that Erdogan wants to rebuild the Ottoman Empire with himself as Caliph. Over the past year, I have been accusing Erdogan of wanting to find an elegant way to enter the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but, well, it's complicated. Enter Iran.
Türkiye has entered Israel’s threat narrative. What’s next?
Will Ankara become West Jerusalem’s next target if Iran is neutralized?
Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett recently made a bold statement regarding Türkiye and its President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, effectively labeling Ankara a new strategic threat to Israeli security. Bennett accused Türkiye of supporting not only Iran but also several groups in the Middle East that Israel classifies as terrorist organizations.
In an interview, Bennett described Erdogan as a “sophisticated and dangerous adversary who wants to encircle Israel.” He urged Israel and its allies not to “turn a blind eye” to Ankara’s actions and develop a comprehensive policy of containment. He emphasized that the strategy should address not just Tehran; systemic measures must also be taken in regard to Türkiye. While Bennett did not specify particular pressure tactics, his rhetoric implied that Israel needs to formally recognize Türkiye as a hostile nation.
Bennett’s assertion about the emergence of what he termed a “monstrous axis” of Islamic political forces deserves special attention. He claimed that Qatar and Türkiye, acting in Syria and Gaza, are bolstering networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. He also hinted at Doha’s financial and political influence over certain Israeli officials, adding an additional domestic political layer to his statements.
Bennett had earlier articulated the notion of a “new Turkish threat” at a conference of American Jewish organizations in Jerusalem. He mentioned a scenario where Ankara could align with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in a potential military-political pact, predicting this would create a new center of power with regional ambitions.
The deterioration of relations between Türkiye and Israel has been gradual rather than abrupt. Since Erdogan’s rise to power and the strengthening of his Justice and Development Party, Ankara’s foreign policy has become increasingly ideologized. The concept of political Islam that underpins the party’s ideology calls for a strong support of the Palestinian cause and views Israel as an oppressor of the Palestinian people. This shift has naturally impacted bilateral relations.
For a long time, Türkiye attempted to balance among various power centers. On the one hand, as a NATO member and regional neighbor, Ankara aimed to maintain strategic ties with Israel, while on the other, it sought to assert its leadership in the Muslim world. This dual approach drew criticism from both sides: Islamic nations accused Türkiye of not taking a firm enough stance against Israel, while the West criticized it for excessive politicization and an anti-Israel rhetoric that fell short of the expectations of its NATO allies.
One of the most significant and symbolically transformative episodes in Turkish-Israeli relations was the Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010. This largely set the course for the subsequent deterioration of bilateral ties between the two countries. The MV Mavi Marmara ship was part of the so-called Gaza Freedom Flotilla, which aimed to break the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza by delivering humanitarian aid. The mission of the Freedom Flotilla was to break through the naval blockade imposed by Israel after Hamas came to power. Israel viewed this as a breach of security and a potential threat, asserting that the cargo could be used for military purposes.
During the interception operation, Israeli soldiers boarded the vessel in international waters. The situation escalated into a violent confrontation and resulted in the deaths of several Turkish citizens. This prompted a fierce reaction from Ankara, with Turkish officials condemning Israel’s actions as a violation of international law and demanding official apologies, compensation for the victims’ families, and the lifting of the blockade on Gaza.
The Mavi Marmara incident became more than just a diplomatic crisis; it marked a turning point in Türkiye’s relations with Israel. Türkiye recalled its ambassador, downgraded bilateral relations, and effectively dismantled military cooperation, which had been a cornerstone of cooperation between the two countries. The Turkish public came to view Israel as a state that used force against Turkish citizens engaged in a humanitarian mission. Conversely, in Israel, the incident reinforced the view of Türkiye as a supporter of political factions hostile to Israeli policy in Gaza.
Despite subsequent attempts at partial normalization of relations, including apologies and discussions over compensation, trust was never fully restored. Moreover, the Mavi Marmara incident represented a point of no return: while prior to 2010, tensions were primarily rhetorical and ideological, afterwards they became more permanent and official.
From diplomatic strain to strategic distrust
Since then, every escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict has automatically impacted relations between Ankara and West Jerusalem. The events of 2023 only exacerbated the existing mistrust: the tragic events of October 7, 2023, followed by Israeli military actions in Gaza led to a further deterioration of relations. Ankara’s response was highly critical – the Turkish authorities publicly called the actions of the IDF disproportionate and condemned mass civilian casualties in Gaza. From that moment on, bilateral relations became ‘frozen’ and were characterized by a confrontational rhetoric and strategic distrust that was close to a ‘cold war’.
Within the Israeli political landscape, some advocate for a more rigid stance towards Türkiye, while others favor a more pragmatic approach; however, the general stance regarding Türkiye is similar. Naftali Bennett has long been known for his staunch anti-Turkish position, viewing Ankara as a potential strategic adversary that could emerge as Israel’s next significant threat after Iran.
In contrast, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, despite his personal animosity towards Erdogan and occasional sharp remarks, typically adopts a more pragmatic approach. His rhetoric often leaves room for possible normalization, grounded in the idea that Türkiye and Israel do not have a direct territorial conflict and that there is potential for economic and energy cooperation.
Another point of contention for Israeli leadership is Türkiye’s growing ties with Islamabad. Pakistan is the only nuclear power in the Muslim world with a firm anti-Israeli stance, and Israel views the deepening military-political relationship between Türkiye and Pakistan as the emergence of an alternative power center. Netanyahu had indicated that, following Iran, Pakistan may come under scrutiny as a potential strategic threat to Israel. Meanwhile, Bennett appears to shift the focus more squarely onto Ankara.
Interestingly, similar assessments are being echoed beyond Israel’s borders. American journalist Tucker Carlson recently remarked that Türkiye poses a unique challenge for Israel precisely because its foreign policy is difficult to control and does not fit into rigid alliance structures.
The politics of persistent threat
From Israel’s perspective, it is clear that regional security extends beyond just Iran. Even if the Iranian factor was neutralized or considerably weakened, West Jerusalem would need to redefine the source of the next long-term challenge to its security. Israel traditionally conceptualizes threats in multilayered terms, where removing one pressure point often brings another to the forefront. Netanyahu is navigating a complex situation. Israel is shaken by political disputes, societal divisions, pressure exerted by the security forces, and the ongoing war. In this context, Netanyahu is trying to persuade the Israeli people that national security remains a top priority and that threats persist.
In Israel, the theme of external danger generally unites society. When faced with a serious threat, political disagreements tend to recede into the background. Therefore, discussions about who might pose the next challenge after Iran are not merely strategic or foreign policy considerations; they also have significant implications for domestic politics. The government must demonstrate that it has control over the situation and is prepared to confront any potential adversaries.
The narrative surrounding the so-called “axis of resistance,” which traditionally encompasses Iran and its proxies, is gradually expanding within the rhetoric of certain Israeli politicians. Now, in addition to Tehran, Ankara and Islamabad are also mentioned as potential power centers capable of limiting Israel’s maneuverability in the mid-term.
Türkiye is seen as a nation with ambitions for regional leadership, an independent defense industry, and an ideologically driven foreign policy. Pakistan, on the other hand, is viewed as a nuclear power with a deep-seated anti-Israel stance and growing ties to Ankara. From Israel’s strategic perspective, this configuration is perceived as a potential new element of pressure.
Not a new war – yet
Israel has consistently maintained that it views Iran, Türkiye, and Pakistan as rivals that are different in nature, but comparable in scale. The only question is which nation will become Israel’s next priority.
Considering likely scenarios, Türkiye may emerge as the more probable adversary. However, Israel will approach the matter with extreme caution. Firstly, Türkiye is a NATO member, which complicates any direct confrontation. Secondly, personal relations between Trump and Erdogan prevent a radical stance towards Türkiye in US foreign policy, thereby limiting space for direct Israeli pressure.
Nonetheless, Israel is known for its long-term strategy – a systemic approach that gradually creates a favorable international environment through collaboration with allies, sanctions, information campaigns, and regional alliances. This logic does not imply suddenly entering into a new confrontation but rather gradually building a deterrence infrastructure.
For now, Iran remains Israel’s primary adversary. However, Israel will continue to regard both Türkiye and Pakistan as potential competitors. For Ankara, this means that current disputes must also be viewed within the context of Israel’s long-term logic. The situation in the Middle East remains unstable, power dynamics can shift, but distrust among nations is unlikely to dissipate anytime soon.
