US Professor Amazed at Wealth in Gaza City; Notes 900 Mosques, 2 Libraries

 Does this surprise you?

Algemeiner.com 

Gaza. Photo: Wikimedia Commons. 

A professor at the Jackson School of International Studies at Washington University visited Gaza City for six hours a few weeks ago, and he was astonished that after reading years of propaganda about how poverty stricken Gazans are, they really aren’t.

 I was flooded with impressions as we drove into the old city of Gaza. The first was, unexpectedly, that it looked nothing like India. Given the severe poverty, even humanitarian crisis, that Gaza as a whole is experiencing, I had expected the obvious and wrenching poverty that I had seen in some Indian cities or many other Third World countries, for that matter—collapsing infrastructure, rickety shacks, a surfeit of beggars, children in rags, adults sleeping on the sidewalks. At least in this part of the city and others that I saw later in the day, none of that was visible. Instead, I saw hordes of children going to school, university students walking in and out of the gates of the two universities—both the children and the university students reasonably dressed. I observed morning shoppers buying vegetables and fruits from stands, shopkeepers opening their shops, and people walking purposefully to wherever they were going for the start of the day. There were cranes and construction workers everywhere, with lots of uncompleted buildings being worked on. A garbage truck, with a UN sign on it, was making its rounds.

There was the occasional bombed out building, from the 2014 War. One had the entire top of the building, several stories, simply blown off. But other than those, most buildings were in decent shape, and some apartment buildings were downright nice. There were definitely some junkers on the road, but most of the cars looked like late-model varieties. Some of the side streets were pocked and broken up; the main thoroughfares, though, were in good shape. There were almost no traffic lights, and traffic was a bit chaotic. I must add again that I was in Gaza City (both the old and new parts of the city) only and did not go to some of the outer areas and refugee camps where the bombing in the 2014 war was the heaviest and where, I understand, destruction was massive.

People were certainly not in rags. Men were mostly in chino-type pants and button-down shirts. With very few exceptions, women were covered with the hijab and burka. Perhaps 10-20 percent of them were in black with their faces totally covered. Incidentally, this sort of veiling was not a traditional practice in Palestinian society; it is very much a product of the “new fundamentalism.”

The fascinating people I met during the day actually related to Israel in what I considered a very interesting fashion. In conversation after conversation, there was a kind of by-the-way acknowledgment of the destructiveness of Israel’s policies and, for sure, a general hatred for Israel. But what was striking was how everyone quickly went on from those sorts of almost off-handed comments to criticize how the Hamas government or the people themselves are also responsible for the state of affairs. There was no obsessing about Israel, which I found interesting. Indeed, there might even be a general acceptance of Israel in terms of realizing that Israel will long be part of their future.

 …My final meeting was with a fascinating character, Atef Abu Saif. Atef holds a Ph.D. in political science from the European University Institute in Florence, having worked with a friend of mine, Professor Phillipe Schmitter. Atef is also a novelist. He now teaches political science at Al-Azhar Gaza University and writes frequently, including for the New York Times and Slate. An open member of Fatah (although critical of the Fatah leadership), he has clashed with Hamas on a number of occasions, landing him in jail for short stints.

Atef’s main contention is that there are actually two Gazas. One is the one run by Hamas and includes its supporters. He noted, for example, that there has been a mosque-building binge, leading to a total of 879 mosques in the Strip by 2014, as compared to two public libraries. In his words, “Gaza has become one huge mosque.” The second Gaza consists of the Palestinian public in Gaza, engaged in all sorts of cultural and social activities outside Hamas’s orbit. If not quite a civil society, he intimated, there is a lot that goes on beneath the radar.

Obviously, the Palestinian propaganda machine likes to keep the world thinking that it is being constantly victimized by the Israelis. It is part of their plan to turn the world against Israel, and it's working. The Islamization of Europe is another method by which the western world will turn against Israel. The results will not be pretty.

The mosque building frenzy in Gaza is an attempt to radicalize all Gazans in order to keep up the insane fight against Israel. Gaza used to be mostly Christian, but thanks largely to Hamas, Christians make up a very small minority on the strip.

Was Forced Conversion to Islam Really “Historically Rare” in India?

BY HUGH FITZGERALD Jihad Watch

Max Rodenbeck

Here is an exchange between Todd Caldecott and Max Rodenbeck in the Letters Column of The New York Review of Books, on the latter’s claim (in a previously-published review of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s Heretic: Why Islam Needs A Reformation), that the Muslim practice of forced conversion was “historically rare” and “revived only recently by ultra-extremist groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria or ISIS in Iraq.” Caldecott provides, by way of answer, an impressively horrifying list of just some of the recorded instances of mass murder of Hindus in India and the mass destruction of Hindu temples and libraries:

For example, in the thirteenth century, Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji destroyed the ancient university of Nalanda, killing all the Buddhist monks and nuns, taking literally three months to burn every single book in the university’s library. Imagine if ISIS or al-Qaeda killed everyone on campus at Harvard or Yale, and burned all the lecture halls, libraries, churches, synagogues, and cultural institutions: such was the untold impact on India, in almost every part of India, for a thousand years.

If you are looking for a reason for 'the dark ages' that is a pretty good clue.

Similar examples of forced conversions and brutality can be found during the reigns of Mahmud Khalji of Malwa (1436–1469 AD), Ilyas Shah (1339–1379 AD), Babur (1483–1530 AD), and Sher Shah Suri (1486–1545 AD), all of whom destroyed temples, killed non-Muslims, and forced the conversion of entire communities. Even during the so-called sulah-i-kul (“peace with all”) initiated by Mughal Emperor Akbar (1542–1605 AD), his son Shah Jahan, known for his supposed monument to love, had almost a hundred temples destroyed in the ancient city of Varanasi alone. Jahan’s son Aurangzeb brought an end to any pretense of this institutionalized peace, and went on a rampage, killing Hindus, destroying temples, and placing severe restrictions on already impoverished Hindu cultural institutions.

Caldecott concludes: “Hopefully, in light of this evidence, Mr. Rodenbeck can reevaluate his claim that the forced conversion in Islam is a ‘historically rare practice.'”

In his reply, Rodenbeck concedes the point at once:

Regarding forced conversion and Islam, it is far from my intent to whitewash a long and mixed record. I stand corrected in my injudicious use of the word “rare.” There are indeed numerous instances of forced conversion to Islam…

But then he goes on to insist, backtracking from his backtracking, that in the case of India, the large number of Hindus who remained testify to an absence of “forced conversions.” What they testify to, in fact, is not to Muslim mildness but to the following:

The Hindu population of India was very large, the number of Muslim invaders comparatively very small. Conversion of such numbers took time; what impresses is not how few Hindus became Muslims but how many. There are now 840 million Hindus in historic India (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) – lands once almost entirely Hindu (with a small admixture of Buddhists). And there are now 502 million Muslims in historic India (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), where at the beginning of the eighth century there were none. Caldecott thinks the more telling figure is that of the 502 million Muslims; Rodenbeck would have us be impressed that the Muslims left so many Hindus alive, which he thinks shows the “absence of forced conversions” rather than being simple testimony to the size of the task.

The definition of “forced conversion” ought to include not only conversion at the point of a sword or a scimitar, but all those conversions by Hindus in India to avoid the jizyah and the host of other disabilities imposed on those Hindus who were allowed to live as a matter of policy. But why were those Hindus allowed to live? Not out of the goodness of Muslim rulers’ hearts, as Rodenbeck implies, but in order to have enough people to continue paying the jizyah, on which the Muslim state relied.

Rodenbeck seems to think that the survival of any non-Muslims under Muslim rule, no matter how few, testifies to Muslim mildness. He swerves from his discussion of India to the East Indies (present-day Indonesia), where he claims – correctly –that on the island of Bali, 85% of the 4 million Balinese are Hindus. But that is the only island, out of hundreds, where the Hindus held out. Surely more meaningful is the fact that Hindus now constitute less than 2%, and Buddhists 0.8%, of the overall population of Indonesia (now 260 million) that, before the Muslim traders arrived, was 100% Hindu and Buddhist.

K. S. Lal and other historians, both Indian and Western, have calculated that more than 80 million Hindus were killed by Muslims during 250 years of Mughal rule in much of India. Rodenbeck does not address this issue of genocide at all. Perhaps, since those tens of millions of Hindus were not subjected to “forced conversion,” he may think these figures are not relevant to the discussion — after all, they were quite dead.

And this discussion didn't even touch on Islam's march across North Africa or the middle east.